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Can we Rely upon Fiscal Policy Estimates 
in Countries with Unreported Production 





This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in Italy by employing a database containing 
two statistical novelties: quarterly fiscal variables on accrual basis and a time series estimate 
of tax evasion for the period 1981:1-2006:4. Following Revenue Agency suggestions, we use 
in a VECM the time series of the concealed VAT base as a proxy for the size of “unreported 
production”, and define a regular GDP measure constructed as GDP net of government 
expenditure and evaded VAT base. The results reveal that we cannot rely upon the estimates 
of fiscal policy multipliers in countries with a sizeable unreported production unless the 
dynamics of the hidden and regular components of the GDP are disentangled. Changes in 
public spending and the tax rate generate a reallocation from underground to the regular 
economy which contributes to obscure the spending and tax effect on total GDP. In this setup 
the spending multiplier shows large long-run effects, considerably stronger than those 
registered in a model with no attention paid to unreported production. The drop in regular 
output, after an increase in the effective tax rate, tends to be considerable after one year, 
producing long-lasting effects and a significant increase in unreported production and tax 
evasion. 
JEL-Code: C320, E620, H260, H620. 
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In recent years policymakers have implemented an array of discretionary fiscal measures to stimulate 
economic activity and soften the economic downturn. At the same time, almost all OECD economies 
and many emerging countries have announced or implemented some sort of fiscal stimulus package. 
However, there persists a lack of consensus on the effects of fiscal policy and, in the economic 
literature, the impact of such fiscal measures remains uncertain. This is certainly the case for the euro 
area, and in particular for Italy, given the scarcity of relevant studies.
2  
 
The empirical literature often provides numerical estimates of the impact of an increase in government 
spending on GDP and employment in both the United States and in European countries. Such estimates 
contribute to determine the appropriate size and timing of countercyclical fiscal policy packages. The 
uncertainty about the quantitative effects of fiscal policy derives not only from the usual errors in 
empirical estimation but also from different views on the proper theoretical framework and 
econometric methodology. Here we emphasize that a crucial source of uncertainty is tied to the size 
and dynamic of tax evasion. A question that naturally arises in evaluating the effects of fiscal policy is 
whether we can rely upon fiscal policy multipliers estimated in countries with unreported production of 
15 per cent (or more) of GDP. This question is relevant to many economies such as the Italian economy 
and most other economies in Mediterranean Europe. However, it can be generalized to other European 
countries and even to the US economy, where unreported production and tax evasion statistics are rare 
and the methods employed to calculate the phenomenon are not entirely clear. Thus, apart from the 
novelty of the results for Italy itself, we may generalize our findings to those obtained for all the 
countries with a sizeable unreported production.
3  
 
This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in Italy by employing a database containing quarterly 
fiscal variables for the period 1981:1-2006:4. In addition, by exploiting the new yearly time series 
estimate of the unreported Value Added Tax (VAT) base provided by the Italian Revenue Agency we 
also provide a quarterly time series estimate of unreported production.
4 This estimate is extremely 
important, not only because it provides a long enough time series of tax evasion, but also because it 
allows the size of the underground production to be estimated. After all, evading VAT means under-
reporting production, labor activities and revenues. Hence, the time series of the concealed VAT base, 
covering the period 1981-2006, can be used as a proxy for the size of “unreported production”. This 
allows us to construct and use in the models two important GDP measures: the GDP net of government 
                                                 
1 We are indebted to Claudio De Vincenti, Massimo Florio, Alessandro Missale, Sandro Momigliano and Stefano Pisani for 
their helpful comments. We thank participants at the Conference of the Italian Economists Society (SIE) held in Catania in 
October 2010 and participants at seminars held at the Ministry of Treasury (BBLM), Catholic University of Milan, 
Department of Economics, Business and Statistics (DEAS) of the University of Milan.  We gratefully acknowledge the 
funding from PRIN 2008, “Tax evasion, irregular employment and corruption: cyclical features and structural problems.” 
Usual disclaimers apply. 
2 For the Euro area see Perotti (2004), Biav and Girard (2005), De Castro and Hernandez De Cos (2006), Burriel et al. 
(2009) and Alfonso and Sousa (2009), whereas for Italy one of the few analyses is found in Giordano et al. (2007). 
3 There are several analyses on the size and dynamics of the underground economy for most of the industrialized and 
developing countries. See, for instance, Schneider and Buehn (2009). However, Statistical Offices and Revenue Agencies of 
developed countries have not produced time series data for the underground economy and tax evasion.   
4 See Marigliani and Pisani (2007). Appendix A reports further details about the construction of quarterly time series.  
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expenditure referred to as private GDP and regular GDP defined as GDP net of government 
expenditure and evaded VAT base. We perform a wide range of simulations with government 
expenditure and the tax rate to assess how these policies impact on regular GDP. The results are 
interpreted and compared with the private GDP responses, providing remarkable insights into the role 
played by underground production in the Italian economy and its relationships with the fiscal variables.   
 
Finally, we do not follow the literature that seeks to remedy the shortage of fiscal data of national 
accounts by using OECD quarterly general government data or national quarterly cash-basis data, but 
we employ quarterly government national account estimates. Quarterly government estimates are 
computed by making use of a dynamic extension of the disaggregation method currently applied by the 




Our empirical analysis of fiscal policy, through Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models, is therefore, 
enriched by the decomposition of the GDP and the use of accrual data for public finance variables.  
Since the works of Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002), there has been a large 
body of literature which used the structural VAR approach to estimate the effect of fiscal policy on 
macroeconomic aggregate variables, developing different methods to identify fiscal shocks. By 
contrast, we use a Vector Error Correction model, and study the short- and long-run effects of 
aggregated government spending and net tax shocks, controlling for the effects of the unreported 
production on the fiscal variables and GDP.  
 
There are at least three issues that lead us to use a different framework. First, as mentioned in Perotti 
(2004) and many others, there is little guidance, theoretical or empirical, on how to identify structural 
shocks. Second, using the SVAR approach, important information, particularly useful in fiscal policy, 
is lost. Generally, economic theory has more to offer on the determination of equilibrium than on the 
nature of dynamic adjustments. When we perform empirical policy analysis, we like to obtain 
information on the underlying equilibrium tendency among a set of variables, but also to know the 
short-run dynamics and the adjustment coefficients. We are interested to know how, given a shock, the 
variables react and adjust on their path to equilibrium. Is adjustment slow or fast? Do some variables 
react more quickly and in response to different disequilibria? These dynamic interactions can often be 
very important and insightful in a policy analysis. Other than disentangling the single components of a 
shock (short-adjustment and long-run reactions) we are interested in the whole effect, because this is 
what we really observe with an uncritical impulse response analysis. Finally, in this framework a 
situation of special interest arises since several variables are driven by one or more stochastic trends, 
that is they have a particularly strong link that may be of interest in economic terms. 
 
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. Government spending shocks have, in 
general, a positive effect on GDP, which becomes increasingly relevant in the model with regular GDP 
(after one year the multiplier is 0.8 in the private GDP model and 3.7 in the regular).  Tax rate shocks 
strongly reduce regular GDP and the effective tax rate displays a significant and positive influence on 
unreported production and tax evasion. Conversely, there is weak evidence of non-Keynesian effects 
on GDP when the hidden economy is not considered. As to fiscal variable interactions, a rise in the tax 
                                                 
5 In Appendix B we summarize the characteristics of the estimated quarterly series for fiscal variables. 4 
 
rate leads, in the short run, to a drop in government spending, whereas in the medium term we observe 
a complex dynamic interaction. Conversely, there is evidence of a striking and significant negative 
effect when looking at the reverse dynamic (i.e. a rise in public spending reduces the tax rate), which 
becomes increasingly powerful in the medium-long term. Moreover, shocks in the GDP (both private 
and regular) lead to a robust and permanent increase in government expenditure. Overall evidence 
about the public finance variables shows that the conduct of fiscal policy, during the observed sample, 
did not follow a rule aiming to comply with the intertemporal budget constraint, since a higher path of 
public spending was not associated with a higher path of taxes. Finally, the interaction between regular 
and unreported production demonstrates that the link between the two sectors is very strong, but also 
very harmful in the long term, since there is strong evidence that shocks to the unreported production 
have long-lasting negative effects for the regular economy.  
 
All these points raise economic and policy implications which are extensively discussed in the paper, 
that is organized as follows. Section 2 and Appendices A-B describe the data. Section 3 outlines the 
specification of the VEC model and the identification method. Section 4 presents the results for 
government spending, tax rate and unreported production shocks, whereas Appendix C reports the 
statistical output of the models and the full set of impulse response analysis. Section 5 concludes and 
provides some policy issues.   
 
 
2. Description of the data set    
 
The data set used in this paper has two statistical novelties. First, since quarterly general government 
data, based on the European System of National Accounts, are available only from 1999, we elaborate 
our own time series estimates for several aggregates of public expenditure and taxation on an accrual 
basis. Second, we explicitly include in the model a time series for unreported production based on the 
undeclared VAT base provided by the Revenue Agency.  
 
In Italy, VAR analysis with fiscal variables has been seriously impeded by the absence of long time 
series for government accrual data. Empirical applications have been “forced” to rely on either OECD 
quarterly general government data or quarterly cash-basis data. The sources of government budget data 
in recent works in Italy are the Ministry of Economy and Finance which has published quarterly cash 
figures since the early 1980s, and the Bank of Italy. To quote a recent paper, Giordano et al. (2007) 
provide SVAR estimates using cash quarterly data on the public expenditure and net taxes. 
6  
 
So far, policy analysis relying on official quarterly general government data, compiled on a national 
accounts basis, has been feasible only when considering a few budgetary items, specifically non-market 
sector final consumption expenditure, non-market sector compensation of employees and VAT and 
other taxes on imports. The time series for these variables are available from ISTAT and cover the 
period 1981:1-2008:4.  In this paper we elaborate long-run quarterly government accrual estimates by 
                                                 
6 In Giordano et al. (2007) there is detailed analysis of the construction of the series and a comparison with national 
accounts data. The controversy on cash-basis and accrual basis data for analyzing the fiscal policy effects is explicitly 
admitted and discussed by the authors.  5 
 
making use of a dynamic extension of the disaggregation method currently applied by ISTAT to 
compute estimates of Quarterly Economic Accounts (the method is described in Appendix B).
7 
The selection of fiscal variables used in the VEC model follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and 
Giordano et al. (2007). In particular, direct government spending is defined as the sum of government 
consumption and investment (which includes wages, current purchasing of public goods and services 
and public investment) while net taxes are defined as total government receipts, less transfers to 
households and firms.
8 More concretely, transfers include all expenditure items except public 
consumption, public investment and interest payments. Differently from most of the literature on fiscal 
policy effects, we use the average effective tax rate rather than the collected net revenues to better 
appreciate the complex interaction between tax rates and unreported production/tax evasion examined 
elsewhere (see Chiarini et al. 2011).
9 Such fiscal aggregates have become standard in this literature 
since government spending on goods and services might have different effects, as it directly affects the 
aggregate demand of the economy, while transfers and taxes exert their effects through real disposable 
income that could be partially saved.
10  
 
2.1 Fiscal aggregate time series 
The seasonally adjusted figures in real terms for spending on goods and services are plotted in Figure 1.  
Government current spending on goods, services and public investment shows a steady increase over 
the sample period, with the significant exception of the period 1992-1996. This drop should be related 
to the considerable fall in public investments and the striking corrective measures taken by the 
government after the 1992 budget law which cut all public expenditure items in order to combat strong 
speculation on the exchange rate for default risk. After 1997, the slope of the positive trend becomes 
slightly less steep due to the consolidation effort in the period prior to Monetary Union. However, it 









                                                 
7 We apply the dynamic extension of the Chow-Lin (1971) temporal disaggregation procedure suggested in Proietti (2005). 
This method is based on the state-space representation of a first order Autoregressive Distributed Lag model, which 
transforms the distribution problem into one of unknown observation. 
8 Similarly to other studies we excluded interest payments as they largely depend on the debt stock and therefore are not a 
discretionary fiscal policy tool. 
9 Although the traditional economic theory on tax evasion derives ambiguous predictions as to the tax rate impact on tax 
evasion, as emphasized in the literature reviewed in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), and despite the substantial focus on these 
issues in policy analyses on tax evasion, surprisingly little is known about these problems from empirical studies. However, 
the evidence provided in a macroeconomic setting is quite homogeneous in claiming a positive effect of the tax rate on 
shadow activities (Schneider, 2002; Giles and Tedd, 2002; Davis and Henrekson, 2004). The evidence is less clear when 
considering tax evasion, since data are not available on an international basis and are difficult to collect even for OECD 
countries. 
10 See Burriel, de Castro et al. (2009). 6 
 




In Figure 2 we display the evolution observed for the (net) tax revenues expressed as percentages of 
GDP (tax ratio hereafter) and the pattern of the (net) tax revenues expressed as percentages of GDP net 
of unreported production (effective tax rate hereafter).
11 Since GDP, by definition, includes unreported 
production, the relative average weight of taxes, in an economy with large tax evasion, is poorly 
represented by the above-defined tax ratio. In order to find an appropriate measure of the average fiscal 
burden we can consider the so-called effective tax rate, which is the ratio between tax revenues and the 
corresponding theoretical tax base, i.e. regular GDP. The tax ratio is the one usually considered when 
examining average fiscal pressure. However, this measure is downward-biased in countries with a 
considerable underground economy: by definition, the effective tax rate is always higher than the tax 
ratio, and a gap oscillating around 10-11 percentage points is observed, clearly indicating the huge 









                                                 
11 Following Barro (1981) and Bohn (1990) we use these measures instead of marginal tax rates because it is unclear what 


































































































































































A steep increasing trend may be observed the period 1980-1997, followed, in more recent years, by a 
slightly declining pattern, more accentuated for the effective tax rate and by a new surge at the end of 
the sample considered. However, significant reductions occurred over the periods 1984-85, 1994-96, 
1998-99 and 2001-2005. These drops in net revenues were caused by many factors, such as fiscal 
reforms, policy changes and the introduction of new taxes. The fall in the first two periods reflects the 
drop in tax revenues due to a fall in economic activity and to the expiration of temporary tax increases 
in the previous years: the peaks in the tax rate curve also show the increases in tax revenues due to 
fiscal amnesties granted in 1982, 1991, and 1994, whereas the amnesties granted in 2002 are not clearly 
discernible. The sharp rise in tax rates, especially the effective one, observed in 1997 and, to a lesser 
extent, in 1993, is mainly due to extraordinary revenues, connected respectively to the so-called tax for 
Europe (1997) and to taxation on assets and buildings (1993). The introduction of a new tax (IRAP) 
replacing health contributions and many other taxes may also contribute to explain the reduction in 
1998-99. Finally, the fall in interest payments on public debt after 2001 led to an expansionary policy 
and may well explain the new increase in the fiscal burden at the end of the sample.   
   
2.2 Unreported and regular production time series 
Data on unreported production in Italy are currently provided by the Revenue Agency of the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance, which has recently estimated a yearly time series of the non-reported VAT 
base. This fiscal aggregate is relevant to both unreported production and tax evasion. According to the 
data constructors, Marigliani and Pisani (2007), evading VAT means under-reporting production, labor 8 
 
and revenues. Hence, this time series estimate for the period 1981-2006 can be used as a proxy for the 
size of underground production which, in turn, can be used to estimate regular production.
12 
The size of the unreported VAT base ranges between 170 to 280 billion euros (real value) per year. 
Figure 3 shows the quarterly series for the unreported VAT base and the estimated VAT evasion. The 
latter is calculated by multiplying the unreported VAT base by the statutory tax rates. We emphasize 
that it is only part of the tax evasion phenomenon: it accounts for the uncollected VAT revenues. 
However, as outlined above, VAT evasion is a “prerequisite” and contains other forms of non-
compliance. Therefore, according to the Revenue Agency, the dynamic of uncollected VAT revenues 
could well approximate the whole evaded tax revenues. 
Both the series display considerable volatility, particularly during the second decade of the observed 
sample. The first half of the 1990s experienced considerable political instability and a fragmented 
approach to the fiscal policy, whereas during the period 1996-2000 a more stable political framework 
allowed the start of a process structurally reforming tax collection (Giannini, Guerra 2000). The two 
troughs observed in 1994 and 1999 are affected by a process of institutional reform. In particular, 
during the period 1991-93, some minor reforms were introduced, namely the minimum tax and 
“congruity” coefficients. It is also remarkable that the peak in VAT evasion in 1996 occurred after the 
tax amnesty (concordato fiscale) granted in 1994, whose receipts were mainly collected in 1995. The 
sharp reduction in VAT evasion observed during 1996-99 can be explained by structural innovations, 
such as the tax on line system (fisco telematico) and the new tax returns filing system (Unico form) 
introduced in 1998, together with Sector Studies (Studi di Settore), procedures midway between audit 
selection mechanisms and methods of presumptive (normal) taxation (see Santoro 2007b). These two 
interventions, together with a reorganization process of the fiscal authority starting in 1997, contributed 
to improve the efficiency of tax administration, indirectly increasing the effectiveness of auditing. The 
new upward trend registered in the last years of the sample can be explained by a learning process, with 
tax evaders being “more skilled” with respect to the new tax collection procedures, and perhaps also by 
an indirect effect due to the fiscal amnesties granted in 2002. 
Given the dynamics of tax evasion and the manner in which it mimics that of the unreported VAT base, 
in this paper we use the two terms indistinguishably, keeping in mind, of course, the diversity regarding 
their intensity, as depicted in Figure 3. 
 
  
                                                 
12 The approach for assessing declared and undeclared VAT taxable amounts, as well as the corresponding income, is based 
on a comparison of actual values, derived mainly from VAT returns, and theoretical ones, derived from National Accounts 
macroeconomic data. The latter aggregates are estimated selecting the national account expenditure categories that 
comprehensively cover VAT liabilities: i) household spending and non-profit institutions serving household final 
consumption expenditure; ii) central government current and capital expenditure; iii) exempt sector intermediate 
consumption; iv) other expenditure which incurs non-refundable VAT. For each of the listed items the most appropriate 
data source is chosen in order to respect VAT rules. 9 
 
Figure 3: Undeclared VAT base (right scale) and VAT evasion (left scale), values in real terms (euro millions at 2000 
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Since the concealed VAT base can be considered a measure of underground production, we are able to 
provide an estimate of regular production (Figure 4). Actually, Italian national accounts accomplish the 
requirement of exhaustiveness, as stated by OECD and Eurostat, including the value added generated in 
the underground economy. Therefore, on subtracting the estimated undeclared VAT base from the 
official GDP (national accounts), we get the regular production. This way of dealing with aggregate 
regular GDP may be considered to be rather crude. However, the literature provides empirical measures 
of the hidden economy that vary enormously in terms of methodology employed, reliability of the data 
and magnitudes estimated. Here we try to overcome many of these weaknesses using the official data 
available and, without “heroic assumptions”
 13, we explicitly measure the share of national production 
or income deliberately concealed from observation, against  the VAT revenues not reported to the tax 
authorities (i.e. produced in underground activities). These two measures may have much in common, 
since the unreported VAT base may be considered an important device that helps to conceal the tax 
base of other taxes, hiding shadow activities.




                                                 
13 See, for instance, the Economic Journal symposium on the Hidden Economy and Schneider and Enste (2002). 
14 Indeed, Italian national accounts provide an exhaustive estimate of GDP, but only since 1992 have they also distinguished 
the share to attribute to missing economic activity. Marigliani and Pisani (2007) compare their estimate of tax evasion (here 
exploited) with the ISTAT estimate of the underground economy for the available years in common, i.e. 1992-2004, finding 
no large differences. 10 
 





















































































































































































3. A VEC model for fiscal policy 
  
The primary objective of our analysis is to quantify the fiscal policy effects on regular GDP, YR, 
disentangling the role of the unreported production, YU .
15 The benchmark statistical model is in four 
stochastic variables, namely regular GDP (YR), unreported production (YU), public expenditure (G) and 
effective tax rate (τ ). In order to fully appreciate the importance of including the unreported production 
in the analysis, we compare the fiscal multipliers of our original model with those estimated in a model 
where the two components of the aggregate economic activity are not discernible. Therefore, our 
benchmark model will be compared to a control model where the measure of the aggregate economic 
activity is private GDP (total GDP net of public spending), and fiscal pressure is measured by the tax 
ratio, i.e. no attention is paid to the existence of tax evasion and unreported production. Under this 
hypothesis the control model would be in three stochastic variables, namely private GDP (YP), public 
expenditure (G) and the tax ratio (τ ). Both the models take into account the dynamic of the public 
debt, whose growth rate is modeled as an exogenous variable. All the variables are in log (except the 
tax rate and the tax ratio) and nonstationary time series.
16  
 
3.1. Deterministic variables 
Careful observation of the four previous figures gives a good idea of the difficulties in modeling and 
determining the statistical properties of the variables involved. The time series behave as random walk 
with drift and exhibit long swings away from their mean value (undeclared tax base, regular GDP and 
net fiscal pressure variables), accelerations and sudden “jumps” (effective tax rate, tax ratio and 
undeclared tax base), and broken trends (public expenditure). 
                                                 
15 As described in Section 2, the variable YU is the unreported tax base calculated by the Italian Revenue Agency. 
16 In Appendix C we report the unit root.   11 
 
 
Moreover, the VEC model contains variables both in levels and in differences. To cope with these 
dynamics a careful analysis of the dummy variables is a linchpin of a correct modeling strategy (see 
Juselius 2006). Our strategy identifies the outliers which, like swings, accelerations, jumps and reverse 
trends, cause sudden changes in the variables. To this end we based our investigation on a graphical 
analysis, aiming to obtain tentative recognition of possible outlier observations in the differenced 
processes. This analysis suggests augmenting the VEC by five dummy variables. Two dummies were 
included for describing two transitory shocks in quarters 2003:3-4 and 2005:4-2006:1. These dummy 
variables are used to model situations characterized by a shock at a time immediately followed by a 
similar but opposite shock in the aftermath. The two dummies imply a positive outlier in the levels of 
the public spending, observed in 2003:3 and in 2005:4. In 2003 government consumption grew at a rate 
of 2.2%, compared to 1.9% registered in 2002, whereas public investment recorded, in the same year, a 
sharp negative change, -2.1%. These two opposite patterns of the public expenditure variables could 
explain the peak in third quarter of the year. The outlier for 2005:4, is related to the “annus horribilis” 
for the Italian public finances (Pisauro, 2006), with a maximum peak for primary spending, a minimum 
registered for fiscal receipts, a deep (upward) revision in the figures of the government deficit and the 
inevitable official opening of an infraction procedure against Italy (Eurostat, 2005). 
   
A further three impulse dummies (describing a permanent intervention/shock) augment the VAR for 
the observations:1989:1; 1983:4; 1998:1. While the first dummy accounts for an outlier in the 
unreported production series, an upward shift in unreported production in 1989:1, the remaining 
impulses catch anomalous observations registered for the tax rate: two downward shifts for the net tax 
rate in 1983:4 and 1998:1 (possibly subsequent to the collection of the revenue from the amnesty 
granted in 1982 and after the tax for Europe collected in 1997, and the introduction of the local 
business tax -IRAP- in 1998). Finally, a further shift dummy variable was included in the system, with 
shift date 1992:1: 
 







1 : 1992 , 1




S                                                                      (1) 
 
This shift function was included (and restricted in the cointegration space) to account for the “regime” 
change in fiscal policy after 1992, to cope with the exchange rate and debt crisis and the new pattern 
required from that date of the members of the future European monetary union.
 17 
 
In order to test for cointegration, we conduct our analysis using a VAR with five lags on all stochastic 
variables.
18 The VAR model can be represented in a vector error correction form: 
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Δ= Π + Γ Δ++ ∑                                               (2) 
                                                 
17  Of course, since the shift dummy is restricted to lying in the cointegration space, its difference (current and lagged) is 
also included as unrestricted in the VEC equations.  
18 The appropriateness of the lag order was tested using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Final Prediction Error 
(FPE).   12 
 
              where                                   ;
11
pp
A IA ii j
ij i
Π= − Γ =− ∑∑
== +
 
In our case, yt is a vector containing four nonstationary variables (I(1)), zt is a vector of conditioning 
variables (non-stochastic variables such as dummies and others that are weakly exogenous) and  t ε is a 
vector of innovation. Ai and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated. It is well known that if the 
coefficient of the (4x4) matrix Π has a reduced rank (r<4=2 is the number of cointegrating relations in 
our case), there exist matrices α  and β  (both 4x2) such that  ' αβ Π =  where β  is a cointegrating 
vector and α  are the adjustment parameters.
19 
 
3.2. The stationary space 
Estimation is carried out over the period 1981:1-2006:4 using a two-stage procedure (S2S).
20 Testing 
for cointegration (Johansen Trace statistic) with a constant and a structural break, provides evidence of 
two cointegrating vectors in our data set. 
 
3.2.1 Just-identifying restrictions 
It is well known that the existence of one or more cointegrating vectors implies the existence of 
common stochastic trends among otherwise non-stationary variables. In particular, given k variables 
and a rank of cointegration r, there are k-r common trends, and hence there can be at most r shocks 
with transitory effects (zero long-run impact) and there must be at least k-r shocks with permanent 
effects. In our benchmark model, we have 2 common trends, and hence two permanent shocks and an 
equal number of temporary shocks. In order to identify the source of the stochastic trends in our 
system, following Lutkepohl (2007), we adopt the normalization of the cointegration matrix given as 
follows: 












β                                                                 (3) 
where  () ) r k− β is a sub-matrix of dimension ((k-r) x r), so that we get a convenient exact identification of 
matrixβ , with normalization to one and zero restrictions. This representation is known as the triangular 
representation of a cointegrated system, and it has the convenient property that the variables not 
normalized to one (public spending and tax rate, in our case) represent stochastic trends driving the 
system. 
As we will see in Section 4.2, impulse response analysis shows long-lasting effects for public finance 
variables in our benchmark model. This is consistent with identification of the variables as stochastic 
trends, and their long-run effects are consistent with the ordering chosen in this model.   
  
                                                 
19 See Johansen (1995) and Juselius (2006) amongst others. 
20 See Lutkepohl and Kratzig (2004). Diagnostic tests show a good descriptive power of the system. Diagnostic tests, 
parsimonious versions of the models and plots of cointegrating vectors, are presented in Appendix C. Further results may be 
provided by the authors upon request. 13 
 
3.2.2 Over-identifying restrictions 
After having imposed the r-1 exactly identifying restrictions, and a normalizing coefficient on each 
cointegration vector, a number of theoretically motivated testable questions may be raised (does 
government spending cointegrate with the tax rate?, etc) on the cointegration space  ) (β Sp : 
 
                                                () ) ( , 92 , , , , β μ τ Sp S G Y Y U R ∈                                                       (4) 
where  μ τ, , , , G Y Y U R  represents, respectively, regular GDP, unreported production, public expenditure, 
the effective tax rate and a constant term. With references to the model with regular GDP, this process 
ends up with the following description of the cointegration space (standard errors in brackets): 
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The cointegrating vectors are overidentified as two restrictions are imposed on each of them. The Wald 
test for the beta-restrictions (using Johansen ML estimation) is distributed as a  ) 2 (
2 χ  and under the 
null gives a p-value of 0.08. In our case we have two linear combinations for which the variance is 
bounded. One of these seems to support the existence of a long-run positive relationship between G and 
regular GDP:  μ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − = 1 . 4 92 17 . 0 7 . 0 1 S G Y ECM R   whereas the other stationary relation clearly 
emphasizes a positive long-run effect of fiscal variables on tax evasion: 
μ τ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − = 4 . 7 02 . 0 26 . 0 2 G Y ECM U . 
However, it has been widely pointed out that cointegration vectors cannot be interpreted as 
representing structural equations because they are obtained from the reduced form of a system where 
all the variables are jointly endogenous. 
  
Caution should be used to interpret the estimated coefficients. They cannot be considered as elasticities, 
even if the variables are in log, because all the other dynamic relations between the variables which are 
specified in the VAR model are ignored. Impulse response analysis, taking into account the full system, 
may provide a more reliable conclusion. This means that the coefficients provided by the cointegration 
analysis are only indicative.
21  
 
                                                 
21 Lutkepohl (1991, 1994) shows that the ceteris paribus assumption may not have a meaning. See also Dickey, Jansen and 
Thornton (1991). For an updated work, see Juselius (2006) and Lutkepohl (2007). 14 
 
Nevertheless, the two cointegrating vectors might be thought of as arising from a constraint that an 
economic structure imposes on the long-run relationships among the jointly endogenous fiscal 
variables. We can interpret the first cointegrating vector, the stable relationship between regular GDP 
and public spending (we will see below that all the loading factors are statistically significant), as the 
long-run spending multiplier. Importantly, the linear relationship between these two variables is 
correctly not forced through the origin. Including a constant in the log-linear relation involves a “scale 
factor” that has the interpretation of the average propensity to growth. Conversely, the second 
cointegrating relationship envisages the long-run determinants of tax evasion (the tax evasion 
equilibrium).  
In the second ECM, a possible explanation of the positive sign between the fiscal variables and the 
unreported production concerns Public Choice results on the taxpayer- government exchange 
relationship. The desired level of tax evasion involves complex evaluation of the fairness of the tax 
system (see, for instance, Bordignon 1993, Torgler 2007), which combines both the perception of the 
goods and services offered by the state and the level of tax to be paid. The taxpayer shall assess 
whether the tax paid differs from his/her fair terms of trade with the government, which depends 
crucially on the valuation of quantity and quality of public goods supplied. In the examined sample, it 
seems that the publicly provided goods are perceived as over-provided since larger spending would 
spur the concealment of tax liabilities. This being the case, we observe a positive long-run equilibrium 
relationship between public spending and tax evasion. Thus, high tax rates and high public expenditure 
levels are accompanied by a higher level of tax evasion: in the long term the intertemporal budget 
constraint requires that high expenditure corresponds to high tax revenues.  
 
3.3. Adjustment coefficients 
Using a two-stage procedure in which the beta vectors are estimated first and then fixed in the second 
stage, we may treat alphas in the same way as the short-run parameters. The strategy chosen is 
sequential elimination of the short run parameters and loading factors, based on model selection criteria 
(AIC).
 22 The search for zero-restrictions on loading factors provides the following matrix:     
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22 The zero restrictions imposed on the short-term parameters of the VECM, including the loading factors, are based on 
model selection criteria. Precisely, the System Sequential Elimination of Regressors procedure implemented in JMulTi, 
controls, at each step, for the parameter with the smallest t-ratio (a threshold value of 1.6 is specified). The decision 
regarding the elimination is based on the Akaike selection criterion.  
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The α  coefficients relate the error correction terms  2 1,ECM ECM  (already commented upon), with the 
first differences (the short-run) of the endogenous variables YR, YU, G and τ . Thus, 
1 U Y α  is the 
adjustment coefficient to the first long-run relation (error correction) in the unreported GDP equation; 
2 U Y α  is the adjustment coefficient to the second error correction described above ( 2 ECM ) in the 
unreported GDP equation and so on. The results indicate that the equation for  t R y , Δ  contains no 
information about the second long-run relationship since the second cointegration vector does not enter 
into this equation (this is also consistent with the fact that regular GDP is zero restricted in this ECM2).  
An interesting dynamic aspect to note concerns the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium. Coming to 
our estimates, the coefficient  2 U Y α , which represents the speed at which unreported production is 
equilibrium-correcting, indicates that 18% of the disequilibrium in the long-run determinants of tax 
evasion is removed in a quarter, more than 70% in a year. With respect to the first stationary relation 
(the spending multiplier), the intensity of the adjustment of the hidden production is similar, though 
this has no influence on restoring the equilibrium since the unreported production is restricted to zero in 
ECM1. However, the high estimated value for the loading factor suggests that unreported production is 
very responsive to the economic conditions occurring in the regular economy. 
The speed of the adjustment of public spending is significant with reference only to the first ECM, and 
contributes to the adjustment toward the equilibrium in the public spending multiplier vector.
23  
By contrast, the tax rate is responsive to both the long-run equilibriums, with a faster speed of 
adjustment for the second cointegration relation (the tax evasion equilibrium) compared to the first one 
(the public spending multiplier). The positive value for  2 , τ α would imply that an excess in the 
concealed tax base necessarily leads to higher fiscal pressure. However, despite the very large loading 
factor, the ultimate increase in tax rate is quite small: it would take almost three years to accomplish the 
adjustment (12.5 quarters). Conversely, when the adjustment takes place through unreported 
production, only one year would be necessary to restore the long-run relationship, since 18% of the 
disequilibrium is removed within a quarter. Notice that in the second stationary relationship, the 
loading factor for the public expenditure is zero ( 0 2 , = G α  ), as in Italy public expenditure is extremely 
rigid downwards.
 24 
                                                 
23 Indeed, public spending enters this ECM with a coefficient of -0.7, whereas the tax rate enters with a zero coefficient.  
24 In this respect, it should be recalled that the tax rate is the only variable which is not log-transformed. Therefore, the 
loading factors provide a percentage variation for all the endogenous variables with the single exception of the tax rate, 
where the reaction to the ECM is measured as an absolute change. For instance, for a given level of public expenditure, 
when actual tax evasion exceeds the target defined by the fiscal variables, namely  1 1 1 , 02 . 0 26 . 0 4 . 7 − − − + + > t t t U G y τ , to 
keep the target  U y  must be reduced and/or the effective tax rate must be increased. For instance, if the disequilibrium in the 
long-run determinants of tax evasion amounts to, say, 3%, the short-run adjustment in the tax rate and unreported 
production are, respectively: 
point, percentage 12 . 0 03 . 0 * 99 . 3 * 1 , 2 2 , = = = Δ − t t ECM τ α τ
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Interestingly, the tax rate is equilibrium-correcting to the estimated public spending multiplier (the first 
stationary relationship). That is, a restrictive fiscal policy is managed when there is excess public 
spending compared to the level consistent with the size of regular production. The fiscal adjustment 
occurs not only through a reduction in spending, but also through a slight increase in the tax rate so as 
to finance at least part of the excess spending through (hopefully additional) tax revenues.  
 
 
4. Structural analysis in a VECM framework 
 
4.1 Choleski decomposition and Structural VECM 
In the previous section, we discussed the identification of the long-run structure by embedding the two 
stationary relations in a dynamic equilibrium correction system. In this section we illustrate the results 
of impulse response analysis. In order to proceed, however, we need to identify also the short-run 
structure. We impose short-run zero restrictions by using a Choleski decomposition of the residual 
covariance matrix.  
We order the variables in the estimated system as follows: regular GDP, unreported production, 
government spending and effective tax rate. Since we do not adjust the tax rate for the automatic 
response to the business cycle, as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the effective tax rate as well as 
public spending have no immediate effect on real variables, whereas they are affected by GDP. 
Consistently with the literature we set the tax rate to follow government spending, since during the 
sample period under consideration, Italy experienced sustainability problems and the tax rates were 
usually managed to run a balanced public budget. In addition, average tax rates are affected not only by 
government spending and business cycles (which have an immediate impact on the tax base), but also, 
of course, by tax compliance. As to the ordering of tax evasion and GDP, given that we focus mostly 
on regular GDP, we claim that the undeclared VAT base is plausibly affected by decisions taken in the 
regular economy and not vice versa. Therefore we order unreported production after regular GDP. 
The decision to identify the short-run structure without imposing structural restrictions on the residuals, 
except for adopting the Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix, is justified by two orders of 
reasons. The first concerns our purpose of investigating the effects of fiscal shocks on GDP after 
having explicitly included unreported production in the analysis. The latter, as well as regular 
production value added, is a macroeconomic aggregate mostly pertaining to the aggregate supply, 
whereas fiscal variables are mainly related to aggregate demand. Starting from the paper by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989), a plausible empirical identification relies on restricting the long-run effect of the 
demand shocks on output to zero. This restriction can also be effective in the very short run 
(instantaneous relations between the variables), allowing us to order demand shocks after supply 
shocks. This supports the identification based on the recursive ordering of the supply side variables 
followed by the demand side aggregates. Public expenditure and tax rate respond to economic 
                                                                                                                                                                        
   percent. 54 . 0 03 . 0 * 18 . 0 * 1 , 2 , 2 , = − = = Δ − t Y t U ECM Y
U α  
It should be noted that the contribution of the short-run adjustment to the Error Correction mechanism is mediated by the 
beta coefficients estimated for each endogenous variable. For example, for the tax rate the final effect amounts to 
0.02*0.12=0.0024, whereas for unreported production it is 1*0.18=0.18. 17 
 
conditions, here described by the temporal evolution of private production which is separated into two 
components, regular and hidden production. Ordering public spending after GDP is consistent with 
Favero (2002), who investigates the effect of monetary and fiscal policy assuming the existence of a 
Taylor rule for fiscal policy. Figure 5 reports the HP cyclical components of public spending and 
regular production, and shows that in the short run fiscal policy is managed as a function of the 
business cycle (stabilization policy).
25 The second motivation we adopt to justify the Choleski 
decomposition is emphasized by Breitung at al. (2004) and Lutkepohl (2009): although imposing 
structural restrictions may resolve the non-uniqueness problem of innovations, it also raises the same 























































































































































































                                                 
25  Favero (2002) investigates the behavior of monetary and fiscal authorities in the Euro area by modeling a fiscal reaction 
function, constructed by assuming that the behavior of fiscal authorities is determined by an output and a debt stabilization 
motive. The existence of a Taylor rule for fiscal policy was suggested for the US economy by Taylor in several papers 
(1996, 1997, 2000).   
26  We also carried out several identification schemes in a VECM structural framework (see, for instance, Breitung et al., 
2004 and Juselius 2006). In modelling the Structural VECM , we use an order of the variables which is more consistent with 
the standard literature on fiscal policy effects, i.e. G, Y, TE, τ . According to cointegration analysis, we choose two 
temporary structural innovations, spending and tax evasion. In addition, to identify permanent shocks, we also restrict the 
tax rate to display only temporary effects on public spending; finally, the further short-run restriction is set in such a way 
that the first shock, public spending, does not have an instantaneous effect on private GDP. The picture we get from the 
structural impulse response confirms the fiscal policy multipliers, the significant impact of tax rate on tax evasion, though 
the opposite channel is no longer working. Finally, an increase in tax rates reduces public spending, whereas a spending 




4.2 Fiscal policy multipliers 
 
4.2.1 The public spending shock 
The first remarkable result of our analysis concerns the interaction between fiscal policy and 
unreported production. In Italy the GDP statistics are an exhaustive measure of macroeconomic 
activity, accounting for the underground economy, as required by Eurostat. This has substantial 
consequences when estimating the size of fiscal multipliers with a measure of the macroeconomic 
activity that includes underground economy. In order to investigate this issue, we examine the 
responses of GDP to shocks to government spending with two different alternative measures of GDP: 
in the benchmark model we consider the reaction to the shocks by regular GDP (i.e. private GDP net of 
evaded VAT base), while in the control model we refer to private GDP (i.e. total GDP net of 
government spending).  
Figure 6 displays the impulse responses to one standard deviation shock to government spending.
27 In 
Table 1 the original impulse responses are transformed such as to give the GDP response (both, regular 
and private) to a one-percentage point of total GDP shock to government expenditure. 
 
        Figure 6. The response of private GDP (right) and regular GDP (left) to one S.D. shock to public spending  
 
 
Throughout the paper we define as “statistically significant” those estimates for which the error band, 
identified by the fifth and the eighty-fifth (ninety-fifth) percentiles, does not include zero (dotted and 
dashed line, respectively). Figure 6 shows a largely similar dynamic of the fiscal multipliers between 
the two models. However, the reaction in GDP to a positive shock in public spending is quicker and 
much more intense in the model with the regular economy, suggesting that it is the regular economy 
which drives the expansionary effect.   
                                                 
27 As government spending and GDP are both measured in logs, the variations in the plots can be read as percentage 
changes of the GDP consequent to one standard deviation shock to government spending. 19 
 
 
After one quarter, the output response is weaker for private GDP. Regular GDP exhibits a substantial 
and long-lasting increase in response to a government spending shock. The spending multiplier is, after 
one quarter, +1.2% and peaks after one year at +3.7%. The effects are still potent and statistically 
significant after 5 years. It should be kept in mind, however, that these digits correspond to a reaction 
of total GDP of 0.7% after one quarter and +2.1% after one year.   
 
Table 1: the response of GDP to a positive shock to public spending and taxation 
 Benchmark 




Shock to G by 1% of GDP    
Impact  0 0 
+1  1.2%** +0.2% 
1 year (+4)  3.7%** +0.8%** 
3 years (+12)  3.9%** +0.7% 
5 years (+20)  4.7%* +0.8% 
Shock to tax rate by 1 percentage point    
Impact  0 0 
+1  -0.3%** +0.2% 
1 year (+4)  -1.06%** +0.2% 
3 years (+12)  -0.4%
  -0.00 % 
5 years (+20)  -0.9% -0.3% 
** and (*) denote statistical significance, respectively, at the 5% and (15%) level. 
These surprising findings show that the public expenditure effects on regular production in Italy are 
strong and very persistent. The results can, to a large extent, be traced back to differences in the GDP 
measure used in the models (in the period considered, on average, the total GDP is composed by 22% 
of direct public spending and 20% of underground production). Moreover, controlling for non-
compliance allows us to take into account some crucial effects otherwise neglected: Figure 8 and Table 
2, below, and the whole set of the impulse response plots in Appendix C, show that after an increase in 
public spending (wages, investment, goods and services) there is a positive effect on the regular 
economy, whereas the underground sector is shrunken, with long-lasting effects. Hence, changes in 
public spending cause a reallocation from underground to the regular economy with regular GDP 
which increases more than proportionately to government spending and the underground component of 20 
 
the economy which shrinks considerably.
28 This reallocation effect of the output components 
contributes to obscure the spending effect on total GDP.  
The lesson here should be quite evident. Government manoeuvres involve both the production 
components. To determine the magnitude of these policies we should decompose their behaviors in 
order to highlight the short-run substitutability effects.    
The intensity of the fiscal multiplier and the quicker and larger response observed in the specification 
with regular GDP adds important insights to the evidence available for Italy. Giordano et al. (2007) 
find that the response of Italian private GDP (net of public expenditure component) to an exogenous 
one per cent (in terms of private GDP) shock to public consumption expenditure is about 1.2 
percentage points on impact, with a humped-shaped pattern. Conversely, a very weak effect of the 
fiscal multiplier is found, in a different identification framework, by Afonso and Sousa (2009), which 
supports the idea of a crowding-out effect via investment. While results available for the US 
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Caldara and Kamps, 2008) support a positive effect of government 
spending on GDP, positive shocks in government spending increase output in several European 
countries although the effects are different: quite small in Germany (Heppke-Falk et al. 2006), limited 
to the short-run in Spain (De Castro and Hernandez de Cos 2006), and large in France (Biau and Girard 
2005).
29  
Our results show that, in addition to the issues mentioned by these authors to motivate their results, for 
Italy and many countries with similar characteristics, the size of the government spending multiplier 
should be carefully analyzed, given the possible incorrect modelling of an important component of 
private supply, i.e. underground production. As we have seen, the empirical effects of fiscal policy on 
these two components of GDP, regular and underground, may be very different. By modelling them as 
a single production aggregate, the literature has so far omitted to consider that tax evasion is a reaction 
of a “rational agent” to fiscal pressure, providing potentially misleading results.
30  
 
4.2.2 The tax shock  
In order to analyze the effect of an exogenous change in tax policy, in the presence of an unofficial 
production, we construct a synthetic tax indicator, i.e. the average effective tax rate.  
Given the simplifying assumption that there exists a single aggregate statutory tax rate, τˆ , then the 
total tax revenues, which are paid by compliant tax payers, are given by  ) ( ˆ R Y ⋅ τ . Therefore, our 
synthetic tax indicator, the effective tax rate: 
                                                 
28 A complete picture of the impulse response analysis is reported in Appendix C. 
29 Afonso and Sousa (2009) find that for the US economy the effects on GDP are small, positive, but not significant, 
whereas the effects of government spending on German GDP are negative, reflecting a fall in private investment. Beetsma 
and Giuliodori (2010) estimate a VAR model in a panel format with annual data over the sample 1970-2004 for the EU-14 
countries, and show that after a one-percent of GDP increase in government purchases, the GDP rises by 1.2% on impact, 
and peaks at 1.5% after one year. The authors stress that this substantial multiplier effect is consistent with the fact that most 
countries in the sample have featured only limited exchange rate flexibility against their main trading partners, which in the 
context of the Mundell-Fleming type model would imply a short-run economic stimulus after a fiscal expansion. An 
updated survey of fiscal multipliers in the literature may be found in Spilimbergo et al. (2009). 
30 See Busato and Chiarini (2004), and Busato, Chiarini and Marzano (2009).  21 
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= =
τ
τ                                                       (7) 
is a reliable measure of the aggregate fiscal burden for compliant tax payers. Moreover, we can be 
confident that every shock to the aggregate economic activity and/or to the level of compliance would 
not influence the size of this indicator, since, by construction, the numerator and the denominator of the 
ratio compensate each other.    
The impulse responses calculated for a tax shock are shown in Figure 7 and Table 1. As regards the 
output responses, the disagreement in SVAR literature about the effects of a tax shock is well known. 
Depending on the identification approach, tax shocks in some cases hardly have any effects on the real 
economy, whereas in others they may display important distortionary effects.
31 Our results emphasize 
that regular output decreases by 0.3% after one quarter in response to a one percentage point increase in 
the effective (net) tax rate. The drop in regular output becomes serious over time, peaking to -1.1% 
after one year and driving the regular economy to a lower equilibrium (still -0.9% after five years, 
though not significantly different from zero). Although the negative pattern is confirmed for the private 
GDP model in the long run, the intensity and significance of the output responses to a tax shock is 
substantially reduced, whereas on the impact and in the medium term the model provides a positive 
effect. The figures emphasize that, when considering broader measures of the GDP, the negative 
impact of the tax rate tends to vanish.  
 
Figure 7. The response of private GDP to one S.D. shock to the tax ratio (right) and the response of regular GDP to 
one S.D.  shock to the effective tax rate (left) 
 
 
The negative sign of the effect of a tax increase on the regular GDP represents a diverging result 
compared to the estimates for Italy provided by Giordano et al. (2007). Although they use net revenues 
                                                 
31 See, for instance, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005), and Mountford and Uhlig (2005). For a review see 
Caldora and Kamps (2008). 22 
 
as a fiscal variable, they find that a tax shock equal to one percentage point of GDP produces a 
transitory but positive and significant effect on private GDP. This result is not consistent with our 
evidence about regular GDP, whereas it is interestingly in line with the result we find when the two 
components of the GDP are not separated (the control model), and obscures the true taxation effect on 
economic activity. More recently, Afonso and Sousa (2009) found for the Italian economy that a shock 
to government revenues reduces GDP, although the effect is not persistent as it vanishes after four 
quarters.  
As depicted by our impulse responses, the counterintuitive result of Giordano et al. may well be related 
to having neglected the underground economy as a component of official estimates of GDP, with the 
consequence that the effect of tax shocks on the these two components, regular and underground, 
cannot be disentangled. As shown in Figure 8 (see also Appendix C), an increase in the tax rate pushes 
up the hidden economy (and tax evasion) entailing a reallocation among sectors which blurs, at best, 
the total effect. After all, the tax burden is known to be the main cause for the growth of the shadow 
economy (Schneider and Enste, 2002, Chiarini et al., 2011, among others). 
Turning to the evidence available for the US, Caldara and Kamps (2008) compare the effects of fiscal 
policy for different econometric / identification approaches in a SVAR framework. While their results 
always support the view that government spending shocks generate an increase in real GDP, they find 




 4.3 Unreported production and fiscal policy 
The high tax burden is usually adjudged to be the main determinant of tax evasion, it being claimed 
that high taxation encourages taxpayers to expose smaller amounts of their revenues to fiscal 
authorities. The size of tax evasion varies according to the institutional framework as well as to 
individual characteristics.
33 Extensive tax evasion implies severe troubles for tax collection, with a loss 
of revenue that can be managed through a reduction in the spending side of the public budget, larger 
debt and an increase in tax rates. 
Our analysis allows us to provide important elements of discussion useful for interpreting the 
composite effect of the evaded tax base on public finances, an issue of considerable interest for policy 
analysis. The impulse response, displaying the effects of an increase in tax rate and public spending on 
                                                 
32 Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) were the first to argue that fiscal adjustments (deficit reductions) that are large, decisive and 
on the spending side could be expansionary. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Alesina and Perotti (1995) investigate various 
episodes of fiscal adjustments. 
33 For instance, the complexity of the tax system is claimed to be an incentive for tax avoidance, evasion and fraud 
(Veermend et al., 2008; Trandel and Snow, 1999) and tax morale has crucial importance, for many authors, in explaining 
tax compliance (Torgler, 2007). There is a large body of literature on tax evasion. See the Economic Journal Symposium on 
The Hidden Economy (1999) and Cowell (1990a; 1990b) for a survey of the tax evasion models. Many of these models are 
based on the tax-evader-as-gambler model first analyzed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). However, in order to overcome 
some of the shortcomings of this approach, another stream of literature focuses on different determinants, for instance 
institutional or governance quality, and social norms (Torgler and Schneider, 2006; 2007) or law abidance (Orviska and 
Hudson, 2003; Orviska et al., 2006). For a study of the phenomenon in Italy, see, amongst others, Busato and Chiarini 
(2004), Bordignon and Zanardi (1997), Cannari and D’Alessio (2007), Chiarini et al. (2009; 2011), the papers in Guerra and 
Zanardi (2007), the ISAE Report (2006) and the papers on the Italian Revenue Agency web site: 
http://www1.agenziaentrate.it/ufficiostudi/. 23 
 
unreported production, is shown in Figure 8 and quantified in Table 2 (of course, only for the 
benchmark model). 
 
Table 2: The response of unreported GDP (benchmark model) to positive shocks to public spending and taxation 
  Shock to G by 1% of 
GDP 
Shock to tax rate by 1 
percentage point 
    
Impact  0 0 
+1  -2.07%** +1.7%** 
1 year (+4)  -6.01%** +4.2%** 
3 years (+12)  -1.9% +1.1%* 
5 years (+20)  -3.7%** +2.6%** 
** and (*) denote statistical significance, respectively, at the 5% and (15%) level. 
 
As expected, larger tax rates imply a larger concealment of production; after a shock to the effective tax 
rate of one percentage point, the unreported production rises by 1.7% after one quarter, to peak at more 
than 4% after 1 year. An increase in public spending, reallocating the hidden economy to the regular 
one, reduces unreported production by 2.1% after one quarter, dropping to about -6% after one year. 
This strong reallocation may be easily explained by the fact that the demand for goods originating from 
government necessarily spurs only the regular market: in the short run firms reallocate their resources 
to this segment. However, it should be kept in mind that since unreported GDP makes up about 20% of 
total GDP, the sharp fall in the underground component of GDP translates into a reduction in the total 
GDP of about one percentage point. When summing this effect to that already found for regular GDP, 
the total impact of the spending shock is about +0.28% after one quarter, rising to +0.9 after one year. 
 24 
 
Figure 8. Response of unreported GDP to one S.D. shock of public spending (right) and one S.D. shock of the 
effective tax rate (left). 
        
 
Figure 9 shows the response of the effective tax rates and public spending to an exogenous shock to 
unreported production. As regards the impact, a larger size of concealed production generates no 
significant effect on the effective tax rate. However, the long-run effect of a shock of 1% in the 
unreported production is an increase in the fiscal burden, leading to a rise in the effective tax rate of 
about .35 percentage points after three years.
 34 This increase is considerable since the measure of the 
fiscal burden here adopted, consistent with the literature, is the net tax burden (revenues minus 
transfers to households and firms/GDP ratio). 
With regard to the response of public expenditure, the data show no significant reaction to an increase 
in unreported production, suggesting that most of the adjustment of the public budget after a shock to 
(non-)compliance occurs through the revenue side. Finally, it should be emphasized that we are dealing 
with direct spending net of transfers, whereas a significant component of public spending is accounted 
for by transfers, which are included in the net tax rate. Hence, the positive reaction displayed by the tax 
rate to a shock in evasion could also be consequent to a reduction in government spending in transfers.  
 
                                                 
34 Though the effective tax rate is expressed in absolute value  and not in logs, one should take into account that the 
simulated shock is about one standard deviation, i.e., for unreported production, 1.7%. 25 
 
Figure 9. The response of public spending (right) and effective tax rate (left) to one S.D. shock to unreported 
production 
        
 
 
4.4 Tax and spending: some unexpected interactions  
A large body of literature has debated the dynamic relationship between tax revenues and public 
expenditure. The issue is of major interest in situations characterized by large budget deficits, since it 
helps to understand the best strategy to reduce imbalances. 
As claimed by Hoover and Sheffrin (1992), causality is a slippery concept. However, the causal 
question at stake in this debate is clear: if it is possible to intervene to control one of the variables 
(spending or taxation) directly, would that yield control over the other variable.  
“Fiscal synchronization” of spending and taxation is implicit in many electoral models, based on 
individual optimal behavior. Under majority vote, the median voter supports the amount of public 
spending on taxation to satisfy the preferences of the community.
35 A clear direction of causation 
between spending and taxation is emphasized by the “spend-and-tax” hypothesis. Here changes in 
public spending would lead to taxation. Therefore, in order to cut the public deficit it is mandatory to 
limit the former. Peacock and Wiseman (1979) argue that even temporary increases in public spending 
(exceptional events such as war, environmental crisis) eventually lead to a permanent increase in 
taxation. In the macroeconomic literature, Barro’s (1979) influential tax smoothing hypothesis states 
that the path of expenditures is exogenously given, and taxes are adjusted in order to minimize 
distorting costs, while the budget is balanced intertemporally.  
In the opposite causal structure, the “tax-and-spend” hypothesis, the level of spending adjusts to the 
level of tax revenues available. In this view, larger tax revenues would increase spending and not lower 
public deficit. Authoritative supporters of this view, such as the economists of the “supply side 
approach”, suggest a reduction in taxes to force subsequent spending cuts. Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977) share a similar view about the causal ordering but their analysis leads to an opposite 
interpretation about the sign of the interaction: rising taxes may limit the growth of public spending, 
                                                 
35 See Musgrave (1966); Meltzer and Richard (1981). 26 
 
since the taxpayer would perceive too high a price of government provided goods and push for 
spending reductions.  
The recent literature using VAR analysis to evaluate the effects of fiscal policy seems to support the 
“spend-and-tax” hypothesis, since many of the available structural VAR models always order tax 
revenues after government spending.
36 Including unreported production in the analysis, we enrich the 
analysis with an issue which is as yet uninvestigated. A warning should be borne in mind: here we are 
not dealing with tax revenues, but with the effective tax rate. As shown in Figure 10, which reports the 
reactions of the fiscal variables to their reciprocal shocks, the responses would suggest that there is 
significant response of the (net) effective tax rate to government direct spending, i.e. spending does 
cause taxation, although the negative sign of this relationship is not the one expected. Why should an 
increase in public spending depress the tax rate? The answer is twofold, and is related to the role of 
unreported production and to the way public finances were managed in Italy during the examined 
period. On the one hand, public expenditure, as expressed in Fig. 8, pushes down the unreported 
component of the GDP, and, given the impact of this latter on the tax rate (see Fig.9) also the effective 
tax rate. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the evidence suggests that a sort of active fiscal policy 
was run in Italy during the examined period. Active fiscal policy means that higher taxes are not 
expected to fully finance the increase in government spending, i.e. taxes and spending do not adjust in 
order to stabilize government debt, which, by the way, increases almost throughout the time period 
examined here. In the Italian case, therefore, the electoral-political process has led to the extreme active 
fiscal policy rationale, running deficit spending (especially in the 1980s and 1990s) by limiting the 
raising of tax rates in order to gain more political consensus.
37 
By contrast, there is very weak evidence of the reverse working channel, taxes leading spending, and 
the dynamic interaction is quite complex (see Figure 10, right hand panel). In the very short run, and 
after 14 quarters, there is some evidence consistent with Buchanan and Wagner (1977): a positive 
shock in the effective tax rate generates a decline in spending. This result, already displayed by 
Giordano et al. (2007), could be related to the pressure for fiscal consolidation, but is not statistically 
significant. Tax shocks have been related to restrictive policies to manage fiscal budget sustainability, 
urging the fiscal authorities to adopt more severe schemes also on the spending side.  
 
                                                 
36 See Caldara and Kamps (2008) for a review of the various approaches to identify fiscal shocks in structural VAR models, 
and the implication of the casual ordering of the model variables.  
37 The importance of the interaction between an active fiscal policy along with a passive monetary policy was recently 
emphasized by Davig and Leeper (2009) to generate positive government spending multipliers. In this perspective, our 
evidence of appreciable large expansion in regular GDP subsequent to a fiscal stimulus might further support the evidence 
of Fig.10.  
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Figure 10. The response of public spending (right) and the tax rate (left) to each other’s one S.D. shock 
      
 
 
4.5 Unreported and regular GDP: some dynamic aspects   
The role of the underground economy and tax evasion in relation to economic growth and the business 
cycle has attracted extensive attention.
38 Though we are deal 
ing with a statistical model, the data generating process here examined underlines two dynamic aspects 
of the GDP-tax evasion relationship (Figure 11). First, there is strong evidence for a rise in unreported 
production to be counterproductive for the regular economy; this can be considered a constraint to the 
rapid growth of the Italian economy, probably as it generates higher tax rates, fiscal disequilibrium and 
inequality. Second, when looking at the reverse causality, there is significant evidence of a reduction in 
unreported production in the short run after a positive shock in the regular economy, approximately for 
one year, followed by a pro-cyclical pattern for the subsequent years. Thus, after an initial substitution 
effect between sectors (regular and hidden) there follows substantial complementarity between them, 
which would indicate that tax evasion is a very structured phenomenon in the Italian economy.  
 
                                                 
38 See, amongst others, Busato and Chiarini (2004), Chen (2003) and Onnis and Tirelli (2010). 28 
 
Figure 11. The response of regular (left) and unreported production (right) to each other’s one S.D. shock 
 
 
This is a striking feature, suggesting that standard models (both theoretical and empirical) omit 
important aspects of the real world. For example, in models with underground sectors, firms and 
consumers may be more willing to shift resources out of market activity in response to productivity and 
policy disturbances than in models without such a sector.
39 By neglecting the economic structure, such 
models inevitably disregard the implication of resource reallocation between regular and underground 
production. For instance, Busato and Chiarini (2004) show that underground activities help to mitigate 
recessions and the cost of high tax burdens by allowing the household to smooth consumption through 
a proper labor allocation between the two sectors. Our evidence concerning the tax multiplier is 
consistent with this intuition, since an increase in unreported activities thwarts, to some degree, the 
recession effects of a rise in taxation. The negative impact of higher taxation on output and income 
induces firms and households to work more in the underground sector, while highlighting a strong 
reallocation effect between the two sectors. Figure 7 and Table 1 report that an aggregate shock on 
taxes pushes the economy into a recession, which is, however, mitigated by the existence of informal 
production (an underground sector) that offers an insurance or risk-sharing opportunity, through labor 
reallocation toward that sector. As depicted in the right-hand plot of Figure 11, these short-run effects 
should, however, be considered with the long-run constraint to growth that the informal economy and 
tax evasion impose on GDP.  
 
                                                 
39 The theoretical implications may be relevant here. In a model with a sizeable informal economy and tax evasion, although 
productivity and policy shocks may affect total hours worked, they may also affect how hours are allocated between the 
regular and underground sector. The structure of the economy and its parameters that drive the agent’s willingness to shift 
resources between sectors, such as the burden of tax, is relevant to determining aggregate fluctuations. For instance, 
augmenting the standard stochastic growth model with the informal sector would lead firms and households, like their real 
world counterparts, to be affected by work and revenue incentives, and therefore push them to undertake intra-temporal 
allocations of their resources in addition to intertemporal substitutions. See, amongst others, Busato and Chiarini (2004).  
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5. Concluding remarks and policy issues 
 
By employing a VECM and breaking up GDP into its regular and hidden components we provided 
striking evidence for Italy on the consequences of a discretionary increase in government spending and 
tax rate. The relationships between fiscal variables and tax evasion were also investigated.  
The effects of fiscal policy in Italy were discussed by referring to a database containing quarterly fiscal 
variables for the period 1981:1-2006:4. There were two novelties in our data set. First, we elaborated 
and used long-run quarterly government accrual estimates by making use of a dynamic extension of the 
disaggregation method currently applied by ISTAT to compute estimates of Quarterly Economic 
Accounts. Second, we exploited the new yearly time series estimate of the unreported VAT base 
provided by the Italian Revenue Agency, supplying an accurate quarterly and long enough time series 
estimate of unreported production. This allowed us to construct and use two important GDP measures 
in the models: the GDP net of government expenditure referred to as private GDP, and regular GDP 
defined as GDP net of government expenditure and evaded VAT base (unreported production). 
Decomposing the aggregate production provided us with our first result: we found that the interaction 
between regular and unreported production demonstrates that the link between the two sectors is very 
robust, but also very harmful in the long term, since there is strong evidence that shocks to unreported 
production have long-lasting negative effects for the regular economy. This result warns that any policy 
which is permissive toward informal production, for its cyclical insurance features, would be a 
dangerous distraction from growth of the regular economy and fiscal reform plans. 
Further important empirical information provided by the model is the estimated equilibrium 
relationships among the variables and the adjustment to equilibrium following a shock. The key aspect 
of the cointegration space is that identification of the stationary relationship between public spending 
and the effective tax rate necessarily requires tax evasion as a further variable to determine a stationary 
steady state.  
Returning to the effects of fiscal policy, our results show that in economies with a sizeable 
underground sector and tax evasion, the standard aggregate estimate of fiscal effects is not reliable. We 
found that changes in public spending generate a reallocation from underground to the regular economy 
with regular GDP which increases more than proportionately to government spending and the 
underground component of the economy which shrinks. This reallocation effect of the output 
components contributes to obscure the spending effect on total GDP. Similarly, an increase in the tax 
rate boosts the hidden economy and tax evasion, entailing a reallocation among sectors which blurs, at 
best, the total effect. To see the real effect of fiscal policy, we need to decompose regular and hidden 
production. In this setup the spending multiplier peaks after one year at +3.7% and shows large long-
run effects. There is a sizeable short-run drop in regular output (-1.1% after one year) after an increase 
in the tax rate, and it is associated with a considerable increase in tax evasion.    
A question that emerges strongly from these findings is why such striking fiscal multipliers are unable 
to spur Italian growth. Governments should massively seek to boost the economy with hefty 
expenditure and reduce the informal component. Our explanation about the awkward gap between the 
model’s  predictions and the disappointing growth performance of Italy is based on the following 
considerations. The first fact to emphasize is that the informal component curbs long-term growth, 
providing short-run insurance against depression but also mitigating the effects of expansive policies. 
Public expenditure increases total GDP and sharply reduces its underground component: following an 30 
 
upward adjustment of expenditure by one percent of total GDP, after one year, regular GDP adjusted 
by 3.7 points but the reallocation of resources in the informal economy amounted to -6%, with an 
overall expansionary effect of +0.9 % on total GDP. 
A second element to consider is that our impulse response functions were calibrated on a spending 
shock equal to one percentage point of GDP. In the historical period examined, our measure for public 
spending (consumption plus investment) grew at a quarterly average rate of 0.5%, which is tantamount 
to approximately 0.1% of GDP. Clearly, the shock intensities simulated in our Table 1 and 2 are thus 
well above the average rates of change recorded (by one order of magnitude). Finally, the evidence 
presented so far is clearly at odds with standard fiscal policy prescriptions: it is hard to justify on 
economic grounds the increase in public spending subsequent to a positive shock in regular production, 
and it is similarly difficult to defend the decline in tax rates following the increase in public spending.  
This puzzling behavior can be traced back to the institutional context, which leaves room for political 
meddling, influencing spending decisions and tax policy. In the sample considered, public expenditure 
was intimately linked to political processes, generating a substantial fiscal disequilibrium. Moreover, 
the problem is that public spending is fixed, difficult to reduce, and an increase in GDP encourages 
new spending (a particularly robust result in all simulations attempted). Following Talvi and Vegh 
(2005) the political distortion can be characterized by an endogenous component in government 
spending, such that decisions on public spending are positively related to the primary surplus. This is 
consistent with our model prediction about the effects of a positive shock to the regular economy, 
which leads political leaders, with a short-run horizon, to envisage an increase in tax revenues and 
hence relax fiscal discipline. Then in good times we will observe an increase in spending, and a 
procyclical pattern for public surpluses.  
When considering the revenue side, the decline in the tax rate following an exogenous increase in 
government spending suggests that fiscal policy instruments managed to (de)stabilize the economy: an 
expansionary fiscal policy on the spending side is accompanied by an expansionary policy on the 
revenue side as well (possibly an increase in transfers for a given tax rate).  
Overall, these mechanisms have led to a continuous upward trend in public debt, and provide a typical 
result found by many authors for many developing countries, that is a procyclical and myopic fiscal 
policy: when lobbies and unions realize that positive income shocks hit the economy, they immediately 
apply pressure to obtain an increase in public goods and transfers (see, amongst others, Alesina et al., 
2008; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Battagliani and Coate, 2008).  
Which role has tax evasion played in this economy? It is probable that the Italian strong downward 
rigidity of public spending (that is, it is ungovernable) has led all governments to opt for the easiest 
way out: a policy of high taxation in the presence of large tax evasion. Moreover, tax evasion has 
contributed to smooth short-run fluctuations in total GDP (recall that the main criticism leveled at pro-
cyclical fiscal policy is excess volatility in output), although it has also caused a downward bias in 
economic growth. 
 
This paper constituted the first step in an ongoing research project. Natural extensions to search for the 
transmission mechanism of fiscal policy include the decomposition of both public expenditure and the 
GDP in consumption and investment components, and analysis of labor market reactions (also using 
the structural vector autoregression approach to handle sample size restrictions). Finally, following 31 
 
Favero and Giavazzi (2007), we should consider public debt as an additional endogenous variable in 
the VAR, in order to fully appreciate the debt dynamics that arise after a fiscal shock and, more 
importantly, study how taxes, public spending and tax evasion respond to the level of debt.  
  




Appendix A: Quarterly estimate for the evaded VAT base 
In this paper we use quarterly time series for the unreported VAT tax base and VAT tax evasion for 
Italy over the period 1980-2006, based on quarterly economic and fiscal information from national 
accounts. As explained in Section 2, yearly data on the unreported VAT tax base were recently 
estimated for Italy by the Revenue Agency of the Ministry of Economy and Finance over the period 
1980-2006. According to Marigliani and Pisani (2007), undeclared VAT taxable amounts are assessed 
by comparing theoretical data (Total VAT base) and actual observations (Declared VAT base) derived 
from VAT returns.  
In order to obtain the quarterly series of the undeclared VAT base we first applied the temporal 
disaggregation procedure suggested in Proietti (2006) to the yearly series of the Total VAT base and 
Declared VAT base from the Revenue Agency. Subsequently, we found the quarterly series of the 
undeclared VAT base as the difference between the two in the same fashion of Marigliani and Pisani 
(2007).  
It is worth spending some words in describing the main characteristics of the temporal disaggregation 
method used to obtain quarterly estimates for the two mentioned series. The method used consists of a 
dynamic extension of standard techniques widely used by national statistics institutions to estimate 
high frequency (monthly or quarterly) series. Indeed, many European national statistics offices make 
use of indirect methods relying on proxy indicators to compute time series of Quarterly National 
Economic Accounts. In particular, ISTAT has been using the Chow-Lin (1971) method since the 
1980s. The method assumes the existence of a multiple regression model at high frequency t: 
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In our case t refers to a quarter. The unknown quarterly variable  t y , of which only yearly observations 
are available, is regressed on k  proxy indicators which can be observed at quarterly frequency and are 
included in vector 
'
t x . The model, as presented in equation (A.1),  assumes quarterly residuals are 
generated by a first-order Markov model without drift. The model cannot be estimated at quarterly 
level due to the lack of information on variable  t y and hence estimation is to be performed at yearly 
frequency. The model is aggregated by multiplying both sides of the equation referring to  t y for a 
suitable aggregation matrix. In particular, as dealing with flow variables, the model is aggregated by 
using a matrix which allows quarters for each year to be summed. As a consequence of this time 
constraint, the sum of computed quarterly estimates of variable t y  in each year is equal to the 
corresponding yearly observation, so that the mean disaggregation error is zero by construction. 
After the revision of national accounts in 2005, ISTAT added the Fernàndez (1981) method to the 
Chow-Lin benchmark. Unlike the Chow-Lin method, this more recent model implicitly assumes the  t y  
series and the k indicators are not cointegrated, or if they are, that the model is not the cointegration 
one. In line with this assumption, quarterly residuals are supposed to be generated by a random walk by 
setting φ =1 in equation (A.1).  33 
 
Both the methods provide quarterly BLU estimates which consist of two components: the first includes 
the effects of indicators, while the second consists of the so-called adjustment part, which operates the 
smoothing of the estimated yearly residuals across the corresponding quarters. Different hypotheses on 
residuals lead to different shapes of the smoothing matrix, which is a function of parameter φ , and thus 
lead to different quarterly estimates. 
The broader Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model of first order in equation (A.2) nests both 
the Chow-Lin and the Fernandez methods:
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The two static aforementioned models can be considered as a restricted version of the ADL model. It 
can be shown that under the following restriction:  
 
                     10 = β φβ −                                                                                                              (A.3) 
 
the ADL model yields the Chow-Lin model while, under both the restrictions in equation (A.3) and 
(A.4), the model yields the Fernàndez approach: 
 
                       =1 φ                                                                                                                    (A.4)  
 
The estimation of the broader model instead of the Chow-Lin version avoids any potential biases in the 
coefficients of indicators whenever the common root restriction in (A.3) does not hold. Use of a more 
general specification thus allows selection of the proper model to describe the relationship between the 
series to be disaggregated and indicators. 
The approach suggested in Proietti (2006) also proposes a new estimation procedure which relies on 
the state space representation of the ADL model, allowing the distribution problem to be transformed 
into one of unknown observation. The procedure also provides the computation of the standardized 
Kalman Filter innovations which are useful for checking the statistical properties of quarterly estimates. 
In line with recent practice adopted by ISTAT, parameters are computed by using the maximization of 
likelihood function.
41  
Our application consists in a simplified and more parsimonious version of the general procedure 
considering k  indicators, as we rely on a single indicator selected according to the economic meaning 
of variables.  
In order to disaggregate the yearly time series of the Total VAT base we use a quarterly indicator 
computed as the sum of GDP and net imports. The indicator assesses the amount of economic 
resources produced at national level and it is thought to be a good proxy for the theoretical VAT base. 
In the case of the Declared VAT base we used the quarterly series of net indirect taxes (net of 
                                                 
40 As shown in Proietti (2006), when the ADL model is reformulated according to first differences of  t y and  t x  it yields 
the Litterman (1985) model, which is the third model included in the so-called Chow-Lin family. 
41 After the 2005 review, ISTAT moved from the Barbone et al. (1981) estimation strategy, which relied on feasible 
generalized least squares, to the maximum likelihood estimation, which is still performed within an iterative grid search 
procedure to estimate the first autoregressive parameter in the restricted range.  34 
 
contributions on production), which includes actual VAT returns. The quarterly indicators are from the 
Con-Istat quarterly database, containing Quarterly National Accounts time series. Data, which are 
available from the first quarter of 1980, are at nominal prices and seasonally adjusted with trading day 
correction at source.  
For each yearly series we estimated three models: i) the Autoregressive Distributed Lag model 
(henceforth ADL) in equation (A.2), with the addition of a constant term and a linear trend, ii) the 
nested Chow-Lin model (henceforth CL) found by imposing restriction (A.3) into the ADL 
specification, with the addition of a constant term and a linear trend, iii) the Fernàndez model 
(henceforth FE) found by imposing restrictions (A.3) and (A.4) into the ADL specification. In the latter 
case, the model is estimated by using first differences, considering only the constant term.  
The selection of the proper model is based on the stochastic properties of smoothed estimates derived 
from their standardized Kalman Filter innovations. The latter are computed by the filter as the one-step 
ahead forecast error. Standardization is made on the basis of the standard deviation.
42 Although 
filtering is useful for diagnostics, we consider smoothed estimates in order to exploit the whole 
information contained in the estimation set.  
Further, we base the selection of the proper specification on the ability of the models to minimize the 
revision error associated to quarterly estimates. According to the European System of National 
Accounts, the revision error can be defined as the difference between quarterly extrapolations for year 
t+1, obtained by the model using information up to time t, and the revised quarterly estimates 
computed once the t+1 yearly observation becomes available. To this end, we performed a rolling 
forecast experiment consisting in re-estimating the three models with the addition of one more 
observation at a time, starting from 1992 up to 2006. At the beginning of each year we made dynamic 
projections for the four subsequent quarters by using only the observations up to the previous year. We 
then computed the updated quarterly estimates by adding the subsequent yearly observation to the 
estimation set. In this way, we obtained two values at each quarter over the period 1993-2006: 
projections, based on old yearly information, and the revised estimates incorporating the new yearly 
observation. We computed the revision error at each quarter as the difference between the two values. 
Afterwards, we took the mean for each quarter over the 14-year-period, by obtaining four mean 
revision errors, assessing respectively the error occurring on average in the first, second, third and 
fourth quarter.  
The main results are summarized in the following three tables. As regards the Total VAT base, Table 
A.1 shows that the quarterly indicator referring to the amount of economic resources exerts significant 











                                                 
42 For a more detailed discussion on the topic see Proietti (2006).  35 
 
Table A.1 Total VAT base, main parameter estimates 
Method β0 β1 φ− φ ∗ β 0
Adl 0.42 -0.41 0.97 -0.41
(5.71) (-5.74)
Cl 0.39 … 0.97
(4.97)
Fe 0.39 … 1.00
(5.19)
 Main parameter estimates
Total VAT base
(Student's t in brackets)
 
 
As expected, regression effects are always positive at contemporaneous dates, and negative one-period 
lagged in the ADL model. Results also suggest the common root restriction in equation (A.3) can be 
accepted, and that therefore the use of the Chow-Lin or the Fernandez model would be advisable. The 
shift to restricted versions allows a gain in efficiency due to the reduction in the number of parameters 
to be estimated. 
No major differences can, however, be observed in estimating the three models (ADL, CL and FE), 
even when considering their growth rates. Smoothed estimates for the FE model are presented in the 
left-hand panel of figure A.1. 
 
Figure A.1 Total VAT base, Fernàndez model 




According to results from the diagnostic check in the right-hand panel of figure A.1, the estimates show 
quite good statistical properties. The standardized Kalman Filter innovations can be considered a white 
noise process; innovations show a symmetric distribution without any problem of Kurtosis and very 
close to a Normal one. Finally, autocorrelation seems to be absent.  
We considered the results obtained from the rolling estimation in order to identify the method which is 







Table A.2 Total VAT base, revision errors 
 
 
As shown in table A.2, the FE model is the one whose mean root square revision error is the lowest 
over quarters. The corresponding smoothed estimates are therefore considered the most correct for 
constructing the evaded VAT base variable. 
As regards the Declared VAT base, estimation showed less satisfactory results than those obtained for 
the Total VAT base. As expected, regression effects are positive but the quarterly indicator referring to 
net indirect taxes does not seems to exert statistically significant effects on the variable to disaggregate, 
especially in the ADL model, as shown by Student’s t in Table A.3.  
 
 
Table A.3 Total VAT base, main parameter estimates 
Method β0 β1 φ− φ ∗ β 0
Adl 0.13 0.24 0.63 -0.08
(0.13) (0.25)
Cl 0.88 … 0.69
(1.59)
Fe 1.45 … 1.00
(1.96)
(Student's t in brackets)
Declared VAT base
 Main parameter estimates
 
 
The common root condition can be accepted and the CL model can be considered the proper 
specification instead of the broader ADL specification. For a two-side Student’s t test at the 5 per cent 
level of confidence and with 21 degrees of freedom, the critical value is 2.08. The standard error of β1 




08 . 0 24 . 0
) 4 25 ( =
+
= − t  
 
The test clearly suggests accepting the H0 hypothesis of β1 = -φ*β0.  37 
 
However, even when considering the CL model, the statistical significance of the quarterly indicator is 
not accepted either at the 5 or 10 per cent level. Differently, β0  is statistically significant at the 10 per 
cent level in the FE model.  
 
Panel a of Figure A.3 shows smoothed estimates deriving from the CL model and their statistical 
properties. There clearly emerges a larger confidence interval around estimates than that observed in 
the previous case (see the lower left-hand panel in Figure A.1 for a comparison). As a major 
consequence, the smoothed estimates of the Declared VAT base are less precise than that found for the 
Total VAT base. 
 
Figure A.2 Declared VAT base, Chow-Lin model 
Panel a                                                                     Panel b 
 
 
However, compared with the estimates found with the ADL and the FE method, the estimates from the 
CL model are the most precise with the lowest root mean square error.  
Results from diagnostic checking on the standardized Kalman Filter innovations suggest the 
innovations present a symmetric distribution and no significant autocorrelation problems.  
The rolling experiment provides additional information. It clearly suggests that the ADL model 
underperforms with respect to its restricted versions. Also, the comparison between the CL and the FE 
is not straightforward, except when considering the root mean square revision error. As shown in Table 
A.4, according to the latter indicator, the CL model on average outperforms that of FE in the second, 













Tab A.4 Declared VAT base, revision histories 
 
 
Hence, as a conclusion of the analysis, we consider the smoothed estimates corresponding to the Chow-
Lin model as the correct for constructing the declared VAT base. 
As further proof of the reliability of data, we also tried to disaggregate the series of Declared VAT by 
considering two indicators, net indirect taxes and the ratio of employees over self-employed. The ratio 
of employees over self-employed is computed by using data from the CON-ISTAT quarterly database 
and refers to the total economy; it is expressed in full-time equivalent and seasonally-adjusted by the 
source. 
First, the inclusion of this second indicator strengthens regression effects exerted by net indirect taxes 
in the Fernàndez model: the Student’s t associated to contemporaneous effects goes up from 1.96 to 
2.26 as shown in Table A.5. Estimation effects of indirect taxes are again not significant either at 5 or 
10 per cent in the other two models under consideration (ADL and CL). 
The ratio of employees to self-employed exerts positive effects on the declared VAT base as expected. 
The main parameter estimates shown in Table A.5 suggest the existence of significant 
contemporaneous and one-period lag effects in the Fernàndez model and significant contemporaneous 
effects in the ADL model, but only at 0.90 per cent of confidence (Student’s t with 21 degrees of 
freedom is equal to 1.725 in a two-sided alternative test). 
 
 
Tab A.5 Declared VAT base, main parameters using two indicators 
x1 x2
Method β0 β1 β0 β1 φ− φ ∗ β 0− φ ∗ β 0
Adl 0.63 -0.30 3.66 -3.43 0.67 -0.42 -2.46
(0.71) (-0.34) (1.81) (-1.61)
Cl 0.72 … 1.70 0.70
(1.33) (1.64)
Fe 1.58 … 2.83 1.00
(2.26) (1.99)
(Student's t in brackets) (Student's t in brackets)




Legend: x1= net indirect taxes; x2= ratio of employees to self-employed. 
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As before, the common root condition can be accepted by the data. In the case of net indirect taxes, the 
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The test clearly suggests that the H0 hypothesis of β1= -φ*β0
  be accepted even at the 0.99 per cent of 
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The test confirms the null hypothesis at 0.99 per cent of confidence as well and we can still consider 
the Chow-Lin as the proper model instead of the broader ADL specification.  
According to the rolling experiment, CL estimates still out-perform those obtained from the ADL and 
FE models, as shown in Table A.5. Hence estimation results lead us to choose estimates obtained with 
the Chow-Lin model. 
 
Tab A.6 Declared VAT base, revision histories using two indicators 
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
 Mean percentage revision error 
Adl 0.55 0.82 1.93 1.14
Cl 0.42 0.65 0.85 0.52
Fe 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.33
 Mean revision Error
Adl 23 982 1673 863
Cl 315 786 927 580
Fe 93 107 245 329
 Mean absolute revision error
Adl 5500 3705 4782 5262
Cl 3574 1853 2865 3254
Fe 1876 2783 3323 3624
Mean root square revision error
Adl 781.552 522.211 643.600 757.973
Cl 489.083 276.940 355.843 416.536
Fe 250.581 375.165 447.452 482.490 
 
 
However, comparison of estimates obtained with the Chow-Lin method using one indicator and the 
new ones based on two indicators (net indirect taxes and employees to self-employed ratio) clearly 








Figure A.3 Declared VAT base, comparison 



























Panel b shows log-differences between the two series, represented by the solid line. No systematic 
difference emerges between the two series (the mean is zero) and differences also vary within a very 
small range: from a minimum of about -0.01 per cent to +0.01 per cent. 
In Figure A.3 we also plotted the estimates obtained by using the Fernàndez method with two 
indicators and found that major differences occur at the end of the estimation sample. The series called 
“log_diff_cl_fe” in panel b shows log-differences between CL estimates based on one indicator and FE 
estimates based on two indicators. Also in this case no systematic difference emerges, even if 
differences show a slightly higher variation range, from -0.04 to 0.02 per cent.  
As a final result, we do not expect the use of estimates based on two indicators for the Declared VAT 
base to be able to make major differences in the analysis. Therefore, as already stated, we consider 
estimates obtained with the Chow-Lin method and one indicator as the correct procedure for 
constructing the declared VAT base.  
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Appendix B: Quarterly fiscal data 
 
Since the introduction of the System of National Accounts, the accrual principle for measuring fiscal 
quantities has been favored by national statistic institutes belonging to UN. The International Monetary 
Fund and EUROSTAT consider the accrual principle as the appropriate one to handle fiscal variables, 
because committed expenditures and assessed revenues might have a greater effect on the behavior of 
economic agents than receipts and payments.  
Moreover, models with rational agents show that private sector behavior is not only influenced by cash-
basis government finances, but also by expenses and revenues that will be paid or cashed in the future, 
throughout the anticipation of their effects. Also, the recent empirical literature on macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal policy has pointed out that the reliability of results is strongly affected by the use of 
proper fiscal policy indicators, suggesting the use of long-lasting quarterly national accounts data for 
the general government sector. Consistent with this orientation, and due to the shortage of genuine 
quarterly national account government data in many countries, most of the literature on macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal policy has extensively focused on the US and, to a lesser extent, on the UK, Canada, 
Western Germany and Australia.  
The issue is important for Italy, as well as many other countries, where an information gap seems to 
emerge both at yearly and quarterly frequency. Yearly general government national accounts data 
based on the European System of Accounts (henceforth ESA95) have been issued by ISTAT in the 
Conto Economico Consolidato delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche (henceforth CECAP), but only since 
1980. Quarterly general government data based on ESA95 are published in the Conto Economico 
Trimestrale delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche (henceforth CETAP). However, these fiscal time series 
have only been available since the first quarter of 1999.  
Six variables, referring to direct and indirect taxes, social contributions and social payments have, 
instead, been published by EUROSTAT since the first quarter of 1991 and can therefore be found in 
the EUROSTAT NEW-CHRONOS database, which actually extends public finance information from 
the CETAP account.
43 At a second-level classification, neither ISTAT nor EUROSTAT provide 
quarterly national accounts data for current taxes on household (direct taxes on labor) and on corporate 
income (direct taxes on profits).  
Thus, an empirical analysis relying on official quarterly general government data, compiled on a 
national accounts basis, would be feasible only if one considered a few budgetary items, referring to the 
non-market sector for the spending side and revenues from VAT and other taxes on imports. These 
time series are available back to 1980:I. As a consequence of this information gap, empirical 
applications for Italy have relied on either OECD quarterly general government data or quarterly cash-
basis data. Two kinds of problems arise, however, when using these figures. On the one hand, OECD 
quarterly government time series are interpolated without a guide; on the other, cash principle does not 
seem to be considered as the proper one according to recent international opinion on government 
accountancy.  
The first issue, regarding OECD high frequency data, deals with temporal disaggregation methods. 
There seems to be quite a broad consensus on the recent criticism that OECD quarterly data are no 
more informative than annual data.
44 When no official long-run high frequency data are available from 
                                                 
43 The items refer to current taxes on income and wealth, taxes on production and imports, value-added type taxes, capital 
taxes receivable, actual social contributions receivable (excluding imputed social contributions) and social payments (social 
benefits other than social transfers in kind). 
44 See, for instance, Perotti (2004).  42 
 
the national source, the OECD computes quarterly estimates by interpolating yearly data without any 
guide, as in the case of Italian quarterly government accounts. The model used to perform temporal 
disaggregation is exclusively based on mathematical criteria aimed at avoiding unrealistic jumps when 
passing from one year to another.  
With regard to cash-basis data, according to many authors, such data should be considered an 
incomplete guide for the measurement of counter-cyclical activity effects of the government sector on 
the private one.
45  Another stream of literature, instead, emphasizes that payments would produce 
greater effects on private consumption than spending commitments.
46 A recent study of the Bank of 
Italy (Giordano et al. 2007) relies on quarterly cash-basis data of the public sector. Data for the 
consolidated public sector are based on genuine cash observations referring to the State sector, local 
governments, health sector and social security institutions published by the Italian Ministry of 
Economic and Finance. For the period 1982-1993, the above authors performed data consolidation for 
the public sector, consolidating intergovernmental flows when possible. On the spending side, only 
government consumption spending is considered. 
As explained in Section 2 of the paper, one of the novelties of this study refers to the use of fiscal 
policy variables based on national accounting definitions. The estimation of the VECM model relies 
upon quarterly general government (henceforth government) national accounts estimates, namely 
government direct spending and net revenues. The two series are taken from a broader set of quarterly 
government estimates which has been recently constructed for Italy over the period 1980:1- 2007:4.
47 
The quarterly database aims to fill the above information gap and provides fiscal policy data fully 
comparable with statistics from the major industrialized countries for their institutional coverage and 
accountancy basis.  
In the following we briefly report the main characteristics of the temporal disaggregation method used 
to obtain quarterly estimates for government primary spending and net revenues. The quarterly time 
series were estimated starting from yearly observations of the CECAP account, which represents the 
information basis for calculating the net lending requirement defined by the Maastricht Treaty, over the 
period 1980:1 – 2007:4. The temporal disaggregation method used consists in the dynamic extension of 
the Chow-Lin procedure suggested in Proietti (2006). The procedure relies on the estimation of a first 
order Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model, described in detail in Appendix A, which embeds 
the three univariate models constituting the Chow-Lin classic approach, namely the Chow-Lin, 
Fernàndez and Litterman models.
 The fiscal variables we selected are widely used in the empirical 
literature on discretional/non-systematic fiscal policy. On the spending side, we focus on direct public 
spending on goods and services. Public transfers are, however, considered for the definition of net 
revenues. 
The source of quarterly proxy indicators used to derive the unknown pattern of government primary 
spending and net revenues is the CON-ISTAT quarterly database, containing data from Quarterly 
National Accounts. For each yearly series we selected one related time series by taking SEC definitions 
into consideration: quarterly indicators of the expenditure side are supposed to include the unknown 
government quarterly time series, whereas the quarterly indicators of the revenues side are supposed to 
replicate the unknown pattern of corresponding taxation base.  
Table B.1 provides insight into the input data considered. 
                                                 
45 Levin (1993). 
46 Auerbach, William (2009). 




Tab B.1 Input data for the construction of quarterly fiscal policy estimates 
 
YEARLY SERIES QUARTERLY INDICATORS
1
Gov. consumption expenditure  Consumption expenditure of non-market sector 
Gov. fixed capital formation (gross of divestments) Fixed capital formation of total economy
Current taxes on income and wealth 
The sum of estimates for the items of Current taxes on corporate income  
and Current taxes on household income
Social contributions receivable  
Compensations of employees less gross wages and salaries of total 
economy
Taxes on production and imports  VAT and other taxes on imports 
Total revenues net of transfers to households and firms
The sum of estimates for the items of Current tax on income and wealth, 
Social contributions and Taxes on production and imports





Quarterly estimates for government direct spending are found as the sum of quarterly estimates for 
public consumption spending and gross investments. As shown in Table B.1, the disaggregation of 
government consumption was based on the quarterly series of non-market consumption spending.
48 
Obviously, government consumption spending includes wages and non-wages current purchases of 
goods and services.  
As regards public investments, we consider the series of government gross investments not inclusive of 
earnings from real estate divestments in order to avoid irregular jumps due to such divestments. 
According to public accountancy rules, indeed, divestment earnings in real estate enter the budget in 
the item of government fixed capital formation with the minus sign, leading to strong volatility in both 
official yearly CECAP figures and quarterly CETAP estimates provided by ISTAT. As explained in 
Basile (2009), inclusion of such extraordinary events in the yearly series seems to be misleading for 
research purposes, and for the economic meaning of the fiscal variable itself. The literature focuses on 
public investments, which are mostly determined by long-term funding programmes and not by 
contingent events. The revised definition of the yearly series leads to a significant gain in terms of 
precision of estimates referring to public investments and also allows this information to be used in the 
analysis of fiscal policy. Gross investments excluding divestments in real estate are disaggregated on 
the basis of total gross fixed capital formation of the whole economy.
49 
 
                                                 
48 According to the ESA95 accounting system, the non-market sector includes both public and private producers whose 
market revenues are less than half of production costs. Hence the series represents a very good proxy for the government 
series. 
49 The choice of an indicator for government investments is not easy and, at present, it appears to be controversial. The use 
of an indicator referring to part of aggregate demand might produce some bias when using government investment estimates 
to assess their impact on GDP. We thank Sandro Momigliano for some discussion on this issue. 44 
 
-Net revenues  
Net revenues are defined as total revenues less monetary social benefits (including pensions and other 
assistance monetary transfers), “other current expenditure” (including production subsidies), and “other 
capital expenditure” (including investment subsidies).
50 The variable is widely used in fiscal policy 
VAR models and in macroeconomic models with credit constraints where fiscal policy is supposed to 
produce economic effects via the demand-side channels.
51  
The disaggregation of the net revenues was based on a two-step approach. In the first step, we 
estimated quarterly series for direct taxes, social contributions and indirect taxes. These estimates were 
then used to proxy the unknown pattern of the whole amount of net revenues.
52 The quarterly indicator 
used in the disaggregation is, indeed, found as the sum of the quarterly estimates for current taxes on 
income and wealth, taxes on production and imports, and social contributions. 
The quarterly government estimates used in this analysis benefit from the following main 
characteristics: i) they are time-consistent with the corresponding official yearly data from ISTAT in 
the sense that the sum of quarterly data is equal to the corresponding year observation, ii) they are 
consistent with the economic accrual principle set by ESA95 as both yearly observations and quarterly 
indicators are complied with according to the economic accrual principle, iii) they are fully comparable 
with official quarterly national accounts data issued by the national statistics institutes of other 
industrialized countries.  
                                                 
50 Interest payments were excluded from the definition of net revenues. See De Castro (2004) amongst others. 
51 See, for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
52 For more details on the disaggregation results and a comparison of estimates with official quarterly estimates issued by 
EUROSTAT and ISTAT see Basile (2009) and Basile, De Arcangelis, Proietti (2010), which also provide a robustness 
proof of the methodology for the USA case. 45 
 
Appendix C: The regular GDP model 
 
In this appendix we first report the statistical characteristics of the time series used in the models, and 
then the cointegration analysis and the complete set of the impulse response analysis obtained for the 
regular GDP model.  
 
C1. Unit Root Tests 
Table C.3: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for unit root. Null Hypothesis: unit root 
 Level  First  Difference 
  Test statistic  Deterministic (lags)  Test statistic  Deterministic 
(lags) 
Government Primary Spending  -2.11   intercept, time trend (3)  -3.63***  Intercept (3) 
Net tax revenues/Regular GDP  -1.97  intercept, time trend (2)  -4.55***   Intercept (1) 
Unreported GDP  -3.46**  intercept, time trend (1)  -5.41***  Intercept (0) 
Unreported GDP (KPSS)^  0.49***  intercept, time trend (1)     
Total GDP  -1.79  intercept, time trend (4)  -4.55***  Intercept (3) 
Private GDP  -1.46  intercept, time trend (4)  -5.19***  Intercept (3) 
Regular GDP  -2.63  intercept, time trend (6)  -4.54***  Intercept (5) 
Thresholds (constant and trend):   1% (-3.96)        5% (-3.41)         10%  (-3.13).  
Thresholds (constant):      1% (-3.43)        5% (-2.86)         10%  (-2.57).   
^KPSS test rejects the null of trend stationarity for the undeclared VAT base at the significance level of 1%. 
 
C2. Cointegration analysis 
The deterministic variables included in the Johansen test are: 
•  one mean-shift dummy describing a regime shift starting in 1992:1. This dummy is restricted to 
lying in the cointegration space.  
•  three impulse dummies (describing a permanent intervention/shock) for the observations: 
1983:4; 1989:1; 1998:1.  
•  two transitory shock dummies, for the observations: 2003:3-4 and 2005:4-2006:1. 
•  Constant. 
In addition, the rate of growth of the stock of public debt is added as an exogenous variable 
 
Table C2: Johansen Trace Test for Regular GDP, unreported GDP, public spending, net effective tax rate 
R0 LR Pi  value  90%  95% 
0 95.81  0.0000  56.97  59.58 
1 55.85  0.0000  37.72  39.97 
2 23.51  0.066  22.36  24.47 
Optimal endogenous lags from information Criteria: 5 (AIC); 2 (Final Prediction Error; Hannan Quinn 
C.; Schwartz C.) 
 
C3. The VECM analysis 
We briefly describe the main diagnostic tests for the benchmark model (Regular GDP, Unreported 
GDP; Public Spending; Net Effective Tax Rate), for which we also plot the complete Impulse 
Responses. Further elaborations are available upon request. 
The order selection criteria suggest using four lags. Hence the model is based on a sample period going 
from 1982:3 to 2006:4 (98 observations). We use a two-stage estimation procedure: in the first stage 
the cointegration matrix has to be estimated by the S2S method explained in Lutkepohl (2004). Once 
an identified form of the estimated cointegration matrix is available, it can be used in the second stage 46 
 
of the estimation procedure. In the second stage, structural and subset restrictions as well as exogenous 
variables can be accounted for. 
   
The rate of growth of public debt is included in the VECM specifications as an exogenous variable, 
while the deterministic variables are: 
•  one mean-shift dummy describing a regime shift starting in 1992:1. This dummy is restricted to 
lying in the cointegration space. Its difference should be included as an unrestricted permanent 
impulse dummy in the VAR equations, current and lagged, 
•  three impulse dummies (describing a permanent intervention/shock) for the observations: 
1983:4; 1989:1; 1998:1. A shift in the levels of a variable becomes an impulse dummy in the 
differenced variable, 
•  two transitory shock dummies, for the observations: 2003:3-4 and 2005:4-2006:1, 
•  a further impulse dummy, not linked to the break in the data though accounting for an outlier 
for the tax rate equation in the VECM, is added for the observation 1996:4. This dummy is 
necessary in order to provide normally distributed residuals for the tax rate equation in the 
VECM, 
•  constant. 
 
C3.1 Residuals analysis: diagnostic tests 
 
Table C3: residual autocorrelation tests for VEC Benchmark Model 








LM5  Multiv. 
ARCH_LM 5 
Test statistic  19.59  22.95  16.81  9.27  73.48  509.57 
p-value 0.29  0.11  0.40  0.90  0.68  0.37 
 
Table C4: residual non-normality tests for VEC Benchmark Model 
Test  Doornik  Hansen(1994)  Lutkepohl (1993) 
 joint  skewness  kurtosis  joint  skewness  kurtosis 
Test statistic  3.42  3.09  0.32  2.19  1.06  1.12 
p-value 0.90  0.254  0.99  0.97  0.89  0.89 
 
Table C4: residual non-normality tests for VEC Model 2 (follows) 
Test   Jarque Bera 
 u 1  u2  u3  u4 
Test  statistic  0.71 1.88 0.36 1.38 
p-value  0.70 0.39 0.83 0.50 
 
Table C5: correlation of VEC residuals, Benchmark Model  
  Regular GDP  Unreported GDP  Public Spending  Net effective Tax 
rate 
Regular GDP  1.000000e+00 -4.463771e-01 -4.064290e-01  -2.834976e-01 
Unreported GDP  -4.463771e-01 1.000000e+00 6.249293e-02  1.520343e-01 
Public Spending  -4.064290e-01 6.249293e-02  1.000000e+00  1.196190e-01 




C3.2 The Impulse Response analysis 
 
Column 1: effects of one S.D. shock to regular GDP on regular GDP, Unreported GDP, Gov. Spending, 
Tax rate. 
Column 2: effects of one S.D. shock to Unreported GDP on regular GDP, Unreported GDP, Gov. 
Spending, Tax rate. 
Column 3: effects of one S.D.  shock to Gov. Spending on regular GDP, Unreported GDP, Gov. 
Spending, Tax rate. 
Column 4: effects of one S.D.  shock to Tax Rate on regular GDP, Unreported GDP, Gov. Spending, 
Tax rate. 
 
Regular GDP      Unreported GDP        Gov. Spending    Tax Rate 
 
Solid line: VECM orthogonal Impulse Response; Dashed Line: 95% Hall Percentile Confidence Interval; Dotted line: 85% 
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